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We examine variation in the concentration of inventive activity across 72 of North America's most
highly innovative locations. In 12 of these areas, innovation is particularly concentrated in a single,
large firm; we refer to such locations as "company towns.'' We find that inventors employed by large
firms in these locations tend to draw disproportionately from their firm's own prior inventions (as measured
by citations to their own prior patents) relative to what would be expected given the underlying distribution
of innovative activity across all inventing firms in a particular technology field. Furthermore, we find
such inventors are more likely to build upon the same prior inventions year after year.  However, smaller
firms in company towns do not exhibit this myopic behavior; they draw upon prior inventions as broadly
as their small-firm counterparts in more diverse locations.  In addition, we find that inventions by large
firms in company towns have less impact than those produced elsewhere, although the difference is
modest, and that the impact is disproportionately appropriated by the inventing firms themselves. Finally,
the geographic scope of impact realized by company town inventions is narrower, whether produced
by large or small firms.
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Firms that choose to locate in cities populated with many other companies incur higher
congestion costs. To reconcile this observation economists infer that the agglomeration of
economic activity must confer beneﬁts that oﬀset these costs. One such beneﬁtt h a ti sc e n t r a l
to many theories of agglomeration concerns localized knowledge spillovers. To the extent that
ﬁrms in economic “hubs” really do enjoy lower cost access to externally generated knowledge
one might expect their inventors to be more creative, drawing from a broader pool of ideas
in the creation of their inventions. After all, such hubs seem to be unusually fertile locations
for entrepreneurial ventures (Acs (2002)), a primary source of so-called creative destruction.
Following the same reasoning, one might expect inventors at ﬁrms that are located in less eco-
nomically diverse regions and are thus somewhat isolated from localized knowledge spillovers
to be less creative. Furthermore, spatial isolation might inﬂuence some ﬁrms diﬀerently than
others. For example, for a variety of reasons we describe below, larger ﬁrms in isolated loca-
t i o n sm i g h tb em o r es u s c e p t i b l et ot h eN o tI n v e n t e dH e r e( N I H )S y n d r o m ew h e r e b yi n v e n t o r s
are more likely to reject externally generated knowledge. We examine these ideas here, explor-
ing how variation in regional economic diversity is related to both the creativity of inventors
and the subsequent impact of their inventions.
Interpreting the knowledge production process is central to this line of inquiry. Knowl-
edge externalities — or “spillovers” — play a critical role in most theories of innovation and
growth. This reﬂects the widespread recognition that inventions usually incorporate or build
upon ideas or information generated by others and that, in many instances, access to these
knowledge production inputs is not explicitly priced. In Alfred Marshall’s memorable phrase,
i d e a sa r e“ a si tw e r e ,i nt h ea i r . ”
But are these ideas equally accessible to all potential users? Research on the microfounda-
tions of spillovers suggests not. Knowledge externalities appear to be quite strongly localized
(Jaﬀe et al. (1993),Agrawal et al. (2008)), likely due to their tacitness which makes transfer
via face-to-face interactions relatively less costly (Arrow (1962), Polanyi (1966)), hence con-
2ferring beneﬁts to co-location and resulting in agglomeration (Rosenthal and Strange (2001),
Rosenthal and Strange (2008)). Even in an era of relatively low communication costs and
increasingly systematized, codiﬁed, and searchable knowledge, inventors appear to be signif-
icantly less likely to use knowledge generated in physically distant locations. Furthermore,
analysis of the organization and management of corporate R&D has shown that ﬁrms invest
signiﬁcant resources in order to develop “absorptive capacity” to enhance their ability to ex-
ploit externally generated knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Cockburn and Henderson
(1998)). In other words, even if not explicitly priced, accessing ideas generated by others is
not costless and may be strongly conditioned by institutions, geography, and the optimizing
responses of ﬁrms and inventors.
However, despite the broad acknowledgement in the literature that localized knowledge
spillovers play an important role in agglomeration, there is less consensus around how spillovers
are mediated by local economic characteristics. For example, Glaeser et al. (1992) contrast
three theories (Marshall-Arrow-Romer, Porter, Jacobs), that emphasize agglomeration ben-
eﬁts due speciﬁcally to knowledge spillovers. Yet each of these theories advances a diﬀerent
view on how the importance of spillovers to city growth is inﬂuenced by industrial diver-
sity and market structure. The evidence presented in that paper indicates that knowledge
spillovers across, rather than within, industries is most important, supporting the idea that
diverse regional hubs of economic activity enjoy a productivity advantage relative to other
locations. Furthermore, the ﬁnding of Feldman and Audretsch (1999) — that regional diver-
sity of economic activity promotes local innovation — provides additional support for Glaeser
e ta l .( 1 9 9 2 )a n di sp a r t i c u l a r l yp r o v o c a t i v ei nt h a ti tl i n k st h en a t u r eo f“ l o c a lk n o w l e d g e ”
to theories of “recombinant” growth (Weitzman (1998)).
These ideas are exempliﬁed by the well known success of Silicon Valley — a quintessential
hub characterized by technological diversity and many small, entrepreneurial ﬁrms (in ad-
dition to high-performing large ﬁrms) that make up a highly competitive market structure.
However, other locations are also innovative but are, relatively, neither technologically diverse
3nor particularly dispersed in terms of the local market structure. Route 128 in Massachusetts
and Research Triangle Park in North Carolina are locations often contrasted with Northern
California since they are dominated by fewer and larger ﬁrms. Of course there are much more
extreme examples, such as Rochester, New York; Boise, Idaho; and Peoria, Illinois, that,
while being innovative locations, are even more concentrated and dominated by a single ﬁrm
(Kodak, Micron, and Caterpillar, respectively).
How might such variety in city types coexist if the advantages conferred upon ﬁrms located
in diverse hubs are indeed real and signiﬁcant? Duranton and Puga (2001) provide a theory
of “nursery cities” that integrates the entrepreneurship literature with urban economics by
emphasizing the diﬀerence in beneﬁts of local market structure and composition across the
life cycle of products. Entrepreneurial ﬁrms developing new products beneﬁtf r o mb e i n g
located in diverse cities because they can more easily borrow from diﬀerent activities but
once they have settled on their “ideal process” they beneﬁt from being in specialized cities
where production costs are lower.
Other research such as Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Rosenthal and Strange (2003)
has also linked spillovers to location and the composition of production activity, but without
an emphasis on diversity. Others have focused on the relationship between knowledge ﬂows
and very particular features of regional market structure. For example, Feldman (2003) and
Agrawal and Cockburn (2003) link the eﬃciency of local knowledge spillovers to the presence
of large “anchor tenant” ﬁrms. Klepper and Simons (2000a) and Klepper and Simons (2000b)
also identify the role of industry structure in the sense of incumbents versus entrants driving
localized innovation but emphasize knowledge that is internal rather than external to the
ﬁrm.
Finally, theories focused on factors quite distinct from market structure and technological
diversity, such as labor mobility and culture, have been advanced to explain regional variation
in knowledge ﬂow patterns. For example, Almeida and Kogut (1999) exploit the variation in
intra-regional labor mobility to explain regional diﬀerences in the localization of knowledge
4spillovers, arguing that the circulation of people within a city drives knowledge ﬂow. On a
related theme, in her comparison of Silicon Valley to Route 128, Saxenian (1994) highlights
regional variation in the culture of sharing knowledge across organizations (as well as diﬀer-
ences in intra-regional mobilitiy) as one of the central explanations for the diﬀerence in the
performance of ﬁrms between those two locations.
In this paper we investigate another factor that might mediate regional knowledge spillover
patterns: the NIH Syndrome. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this phenomenon induces
R&D workers to discount or ignore sources of knowledge external to their team or organization
when insulated from the outside or deprived of diversity in their environment. Katz and Allen
(1982) popularized the so-called NIH Syndrome in their study of the propensity of research
teams with little turnover to become progressively less productive.1 The NIH Syndrome has
since been widely evoked by practicing managers and in managerially oriented scholarship
(Kanter (1983), Leonard-Barton (1995), Chesbrough (2006)), and journalists have identiﬁed
colorful instances such as Apple Computer in the early 1990s where managers inhabited a
“reality distortion ﬁeld” that led them to reject good ideas because they were not generated
in-house.2 H o w e v e r ,t h e r ei ss u r p r i s i n g l yl i t t l eq u a n t i t a t i v ee v i d e n c ea st ot h ep r e v a l e n c e
and impact of the NIH Syndrome. A handful of managerial surveys (e.g., de Pay (1989),
Mehrwald (1999)) have identiﬁed systematic biases against external knowledge, though Menon
and Pfeﬀer (2003) ﬁnd the opposite eﬀect — a systematic preference for outsider knowledge.
Why might such a bias exist? One reason simply may be that the cost of accessing external
knowledge is higher than for accessing internal knowledge. This is likely to be the case when
knowledge is transmitted by person-to-person contact or when an organization raises barriers
to external sources of knowledge (for example, by restricting participation in peer communi-
ties or travel to conferences) in the name of limiting disclosure of trade secrets (Cockburn and
Henderson (1998)). Social psychologists also suggest powerful eﬀects of “in-group favoritism”
1Clagett (1967) is an earlier reference.
2B u r r o w s ,P .“ A p p l e ;Y e sS t e v e ,Y o uﬁxed it. Congrats, now what’s next?" Business Week, July 31, 2002,
p.102.
5and “out-group derogation” as mechanisms supporting social identity (Brewer and Brown
(1998)). Group aﬃliation and social identity may be important contributors to self-esteem,
satisfaction, or intrinsic motivation (Hogg and Abrams (1988)), and private rewards from aﬃl-
iating with or strengthening groups may therefore play a signiﬁcant role in shaping individual
behavior. Economists also have interpreted group aﬃliation and actions that reinforce group
membership as eﬃcient mechanisms for supporting coordination or developing trust among
group members that facilitate within-group transactions (Glaeser et al. (2000), Eﬀerson et al.
(2008)). In addition, it may be the case that these factors that inﬂuence the propensity to
source knowledge externally are mediated by ﬁrm size. Indeed, we will see that large ﬁrms
seem more susceptible to myopic behavior.
We test for evidence of a systematic bias against the use of knowledge that is external to
the ﬁrm as shown by the propensity to “self-cite” patents. Our analysis focuses on the role of
geography to the extent that location characteristics (i.e., diversity and local market structure)
mediate ﬁrm-level tendencies towards myopic behavior. We recognize that self-citation may
occur for many reasons. Individuals or organizations working in highly specialized ﬁelds or on
very speciﬁc topics are more likely than average to self-cite simply because they constitute a
large fraction of the relevant prior work. Self-citation within an organization may also be more
likely to occur because of the lower cost of accessing knowledge that is familiar or transmitted
by person-to-person contact. We hypothesize that the cultural/behavioral forces driving the
NIH Syndrome may be particularly strong in the social or institutional environment where
the activity of a single ﬁrm dominates the local innovation market. Thus, although the NIH
Syndrome may cause elevated levels of self-citation within an organization, laboratory, or
work group, it is likely to be diﬃcult to distinguish it from other factors driving self-citation.
Here, however, we believe that geography may provide a useful source of identiﬁcation. If
this is the case, then the NIH Syndrome may be visible in the propensity of organizations in
such locations to self-cite at a rate that is above baseline.
Speciﬁcally, we examine innovation in “company towns” — cities within which innovative
6activity is highly concentrated in a few ﬁrms, and which also tend to be relatively small in
terms of absolute size. In contrast to the positive productivity and growth eﬀects associated
with large, diverse, and competitive hubs, in these cities we expect to see a distinct eﬀect
of location on innovation. We conjecture that if in fact company town inventors suﬀer from
reduced access to knowledge, then that would be reﬂected in the prior inventions upon which
they choose to build. In other words, creativity in these locations would tend to be more
myopic, drawing less upon “outside” knowledge than would be expected given the underlying
distribution of knowledge across the economy. This myopia may in turn have a negative
impact on the productivity of innovative activity.
We begin our empirical exploration of this issue by examining how myopia in the creative
process of invention is related to the concentration of inventive activity across locations.
We ﬁnd that creativity in company towns is indeed more myopic on certain dimensions.
In particular, inventors in these locations are more likely than others to build upon prior
inventions developed in their own ﬁrm, even after controlling for the underlying distribution
of relevant innovative activity across all ﬁrms. Furthermore, ﬁrms in these locations are more
likely to draw upon the same set of prior inventions year after year, whether or not it is
their own, compared to ﬁrms in more diverse locations that more quickly refresh the pool of
knowledge upon which they build.
However, perhaps more surprisingly, we ﬁnd no evidence of this myopic behavior among
small ﬁrms in company towns. These ﬁrms draw just as broadly from external sources in
terms of the prior inventions they build upon as their small-ﬁrm counterparts in more diverse
locations. The NIH Syndrome thus seems to be a feature only of large ﬁrms based in company
town locations characterized by a lack of technological diversity and a concentrated local
market structure of invention.
We then turn to examine whether the observed myopia in company towns matters. Specif-
ically, we examine the relation between creative myopia and the impact on subsequent inno-
vation. We ﬁnd evidence that innovations from large ﬁr m si nc o m p a n yt o w n sd oi nf a c th a v e
7less impact on subsequent innovation, although the diﬀerence is modest, but small ﬁrm inno-
vations do not seem to incur a company town discount. In terms of appropriation, a greater
fraction of the impact of large ﬁrm company town inventions is realized by the inventing ﬁrm
itself. Finally, the impact of company town inventions, whether from large or small ﬁrms, is
narrower in geographic scope than those produced in other locations.
Yet, without data to distinguish between impact that is priced (e.g., through licensing)
versus non-priced (i.e., a genuine externality of the type speciﬁed in Romer (1990)), the
implications of our ﬁndings for growth are ambiguous. In other words, despite an apparent
reduced access to localized knowledge spillovers from other ﬁrms, our results oﬀer no basis
to conclude that company town innovation is inferior in terms of its contribution to welfare
or ﬁrm-level productivity relative to that of other locations, even though it appears to be
somewhat more myopic at large ﬁrms.
2D a t a
We construct our sample using data from the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce
(USPTO).3 We collect all utility patents issued between the years 1985 and 1995, inclusive.
This represents 984,888 patents. We limit our focus to the US and Canada and thus drop
all patents that do not have at least one inventor residing in either country. This reduces
our sample to 540,999 patents. Furthermore, we drop all patents that are not assigned to
non-government organizations, including unassigned patents. In other words, we only keep
patents assigned to organizations such as ﬁrms, universities, and hospitals. This results in a
sample of 392,830 patents.
We further reﬁne our sample by focusing only on geographic locations that are reasonably
active in innovation. To achieve this, we use city, state/province, and country data associated
with inventor addresses to assign each inventor to an MSA. We then count the number of
3Speciﬁcally, we use USPTO data that Bronwyn Hall and her collaborators cleaned and coded (Hall et al.
(2002)).
8patent-inventors per MSA where all inventors are located in the same MSA. For example, if
a patent has two inventors, one in Boston and one in New York, we ignore this patent when
counting the number of patents in these two cities. However, if both inventors are in Boston,
then that patent increases Boston’s patent count by one. We then drop the MSAs that have
fewer than 500 of these patent-inventors. As such, we focus our attention on the 72 most
highly innovative MSAs (down from a total of 408 MSAs). This reduces the total number of
focal patents to 264,078. We use this set of patents as our base sample.
3M e t h o d o l o g y
In this section, we describe the empirical techniques employed to address the following two
questions: 1) Do inventors based in locations characterized by more concentrated inventive
activity exhibit higher levels of creative myopia? 2) Do inventions developed in locations that
a r em o r em y o p i ch a v el e s si m p a c to nf u t u r ei n n o v a t i o n ?W eu s eU Sp a t e n td a t at oc o n s t r u c t
our key measures of innovative activity and in particular utilize citation data to construct
measures of myopia (citations made) and impact (citations received). We begin by deﬁning
our two key measures of MSA-level concentration of inventive activity.
3.1 Concentration of Inventive Activity
We measure the concentration of inventive activity across MSAs on two dimensions: 1) across
ﬁrms and 2) across technology ﬁelds. In both cases, we use a Herﬁndahl-type index to
characterize the degree of concentration. We characterize particularly concentrated locations
as company towns. We describe the construction of each measure below.
3.1.1 Concentration Across Firms
We base our measure of the concentration of inventive activity on a Herﬁndahl-type metric
that characterizes how patents by inventors in a particular MSA are distributed across ﬁrms
9(i.e., assignees). In other words, if Nmsa represents the total number of patents by inventors
l o c a t e di nag i v e nM S Aa n dNmsa,i represents the number of patents issued to assignee i,t h e n










where I is the set of all assignees within the MSA that have been issued a patent.
This measure is similar to the well-known measures of basicness and generality that Hall
et al. (2002) introduced. However, rather than measuring the concentration of citations made
and received by a patent in a particular technology ﬁeld, we instead use it to measure the
concentration of ﬁrm inventive activity within an MSA. This measure takes values between
zero and one, where MSAs with inventive activity more highly concentrated among assignees
score values closer to zero and those with greater dispersion obtain values closer to one.4
3.1.2 Concentration Across Technology Fields
We construct our technology ﬁeld concentration measure in a similar fashion. However, rather
than measuring the dispersion of patents across assignees, we measure dispersion across two-
digit technology ﬁelds.5 Speciﬁcally, if Nmsa,t represents the number of patents developed by
inventors located in a particular MSA and categorized as belonging to technology ﬁeld t,w e










where T is the set of all technology ﬁelds to which patents can be assigned. This measure
takes values between zero and one, where MSAs that are more diverse in their technological
4We drop patents that are not assigned when we calculate this measure. However, we test the robustness
of our results by treating unassigned patents in an MSA: 1) as if they are all assigned to a single assignee in
that location and 2) as if they are each assigned to a diﬀerent assignee in that location. Our results persist.
5Hall et al. (2002) describe the two-digit classiﬁcation scheme, which has 36 distinct technology categories
that can be aggregated into six broad one-digit categories.
10landscape obtain values closer to one and those that are more narrowly focused take values
closer to zero.6
3.1.3 Company Towns
We classify locations that are particularly concentrated along these two dimensions as com-
pany towns. Speciﬁcally, 12 (16.7%) of our 72 MSAs with the highest levels of innovative activ-
ity are measurably more concentrated than the others. We characterize the MSAs with innova-
tion market structure product values (TechnologyConcentrationmsa∗FirmConcentration msa)
of less than 0.7 as company towns. The value of this product index for each of our company
towns is at least 3.5 standard deviations below the mean of the non-company town sample
(or 0.84 standard deviations below the mean of the full sample). Perhaps more intuitively,
they appear as outliers upon visual inspection of the scatter plot presented in Figure 1.
In descending order according to the overall level of inventive activity as measured by
patents, the MSAs we characterize as company towns include: 1) Rochester, NY (Kodak), 2)
Albany, NY (General Electric), 3) Saginaw, MI (Dow), 4) Baton Rouge, LA (Ethyl Corp.),
5) Harrisburg, PA (AMP), 6) Ottawa, ON (Nortel), 7)Rockford, IL (Sundstrand Corp.),
8) Boise, ID (Micron Technology Inc.), 9) Binghamton, NY (IBM), 10) Johnson City, TN
(Kodak), 11) Melbourne, FL (Harris), and 12) Peoria, IL (Caterpillar).7
We list these locations and describe their innovative activity in Table 1. We note several
interesting observations about this set of locations. First, they vary considerably in their
levels of innovative activity. The largest MSA, Rochester, has just over 10 times the amount
of patents (10,950) as the smallest, Peoria (976). Second, in every case the role of the
dominant ﬁrm is signiﬁc a n t . E v e ni nO t t a w a ,w h e r et h ed o m i n a n tﬁrm, Nortel, plays the
least signiﬁcant role relative to the overall inventive activity in its location, it still accounts
for more than 30% of all patents invented in that MSA during the sample period. At the
other extreme, General Electric accounts for almost 72% of all patents invented in Albany.
6Again, we drop patents that have no speciﬁed assignee when we calculate this measure.
7We list the dominant ﬁrm associated with each company town in brackets.
11Third, company towns vary signiﬁcantly in terms of their importance to the overall inven-
tive activity of their dominant ﬁrms. For example, Binghamton and Johnson City account for
just under 10% of all inventive activity by IBM and Kodak, respectively. On the other hand,
Baton Rouge and Boise account for, respectively, 86% of Ethyl Corp.’s and 97% of Micron
Technology Inc.’s overall inventive activities.
Fourth, small ﬁrms, which we deﬁne simply by their level of inventive activity (less than
400 patents issued over the 11-year study period), account for approximately 20% of inventive
activity in Rochester, Albany, and Saginaw, but over 60% in Baton Rouge and Ottawa. It is
also interesting to note that while Rochester, Albany, and Saginaw have other large ﬁrms in
addition to their dominant ﬁrm, the other MSAs do not.8
Finally, we illustrate the geographic distribution of our company towns in Figure 2. Al-
though we base our data on a sample of patents issued reasonably recently (1985-1995), our
company towns are predominantly located in older industrial locations. Speciﬁcally, four
are in the Northeast (Rochester, Albany, Binghamton, Harrisburg), three are in the Midwest
(Peoria, Rockford, Saginaw), three are in the South (Johnson City, Melbourne, Baton Rouge),
and only one is in the West (Boise), while one is in Canada (Ottawa).
3.2 Creative Myopia
Creative myopia is a measure of the degree to which inventors are “nearsighted” in drawing
disproportionately from prior inventions that are in some way close to them. We employ
several myopia metrics to capture diﬀerent dimensions of distance. These include: 1) Orga-
nizational Myopia (building disproportionately on the inventing ﬁrm’s own prior inventions),
2) Technological Myopia (building disproportionately on prior inventions from the same ﬁeld
as the focal invention), 3) Locational Myopia (building disproportionately on prior inventions
from the same MSA as the focal invention), and 4) Historical Myopia (building dispropor-
tionately on prior inventions the focal ﬁrm has built on before).
8In other words, for most MSAs, the percentage of patents assigned to the dominant ﬁrm plus small ﬁrms
add up to almost 100%.
123.2.1 Organizational Myopia: Self-citation to Own Prior Inventions
We measure this type of myopia by the extent to which a ﬁrm’s patents draw upon its own
prior inventions. We do this by assessing the extent to which citations on a patent refer to
prior patents by the same ﬁrm as the patent making the citation. Speciﬁcally, for each MSA
we count the total number of citations, Cmsa, made by patents produced in the MSA. Of these
citations we then count those where the assignee of the citing and cited patents is the same.
These are assignee self-citations and their total number is given by Cs
msa. Consequently, the






We construct technological myopia in a similar fashion and with the same citation data as
organizational myopia. Here, we measure the degree to which ﬁr m sw i t h i na nM S Am a k e
citations that refer back to patents categorized in the same two-digit technology ﬁeld as the
patents that make the citations. The greater the share of citations that refer to patents in
the same technology ﬁeld, the greater the level of technological myopia. Speciﬁcally, if Cmsa
denotes the number of citations made by all patents in a given MSA and Cg
msa refers to the
number of these citations where the citing and cited patent share the same technology ﬁeld,






Locational myopia describes the degree to which patents produced in a given MSA cite prior
inventions produced in the same MSA. Although all inventors of each citing patent are lo-
cated in the same MSA by construction, the inventors associated with cited patents may be
13located in multiple MSAs. Consequently, to construct this measure we examine whether the
inventor(s) of the citing patent are located in the same MSA as at least one of the inventors
of the cited patent. Generally, if the citing patents in an MSA reference a total of Cmsa
patent-MSA pairs and Cl
msa of these refer to pairs originating in the same MSA as the citing





3.2.4 Historical Myopia: Use of New Knowledge
Considering all patents issued to a ﬁrm in a particular year and a particular two-digit technol-
ogy ﬁeld, we measure “New Knowledge” as the fraction of the prior art aggregated over this
set of patents that is cited by the ﬁrm for the ﬁrst time.9 Thus, to construct this measure, we
determine the number of unique patents, Ca,s,t, that are cited by assignee a’s set of patents
issued in year s in technology ﬁeld t. We further determine the number of these citations
made for the ﬁrst time by assignee a, C
f







Thus, this measure can take values between zero and one. The closer this measure is to zero,
t h em o r em y o p i ct h eﬁrm’s inventive process. That is to say, lower values of this measure
indicate that the ﬁrm tends to build on the same prior art as it did in the past, even if that
prior art was not invented by the ﬁrm itself.
At the MSA level, new knowledge myopia is given as the average value of NewKnowledgeMyopiaa,s,t
across all assignees and technology ﬁelds in the MSA during our sample period.
9We are limited to patent data for each assignee back to 1976. Therefore, we drop citations to patents
issued before 1976 from both the numerator and denominator of this fractional count measure. Thus, “ﬁrst
time” actually means cited for the ﬁrst time since 1976. We do not consider this data limitation problematic
since our sample includes patents issued between 1985 and 1995.
144R e s u l t s
In this section, we report results on our two relationships of interest: 1) concentration of
inventive activity and myopic behavior and 2) creative myopia and impact on subsequent in-
novation. Overall, we ﬁnd a positive and reasonably strong correlation between concentration
and lab-level myopia but only a modest link between myopia and impact.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
We begin by reporting descriptive statistics in Table 2 and discussing the particularly in-
teresting characteristics of these data. First, the mean level of inventive activity over the
11-year sample period is 3,668 patents (Row 1). It is evident that the distribution is pos-
itively skewed by very active locations such as New York, San Francisco, and Boston since
the median patent count is only 1,392. These data reveal that on average company towns
have signiﬁcantly less inventive activity than other locations in the sample (1,917 patents
compared to 4,018), which, it is useful to recall, is conditioned on locations with high levels
of inventive activity. In addition, company towns are, by construction, more concentrated in
terms of the distribution of inventive activity across ﬁrms and technology ﬁelds (Rows 3 and
4).
Since we base all of our myopia measures on citations to prior inventions, it is useful to
note that the mean number of citations made by the patents in our sample is approximately
10 (Row 2). In terms of our SelfCiteMyopia variable, on average approximately 9% of the
citations the inventors of a patent in our sample make are to prior art from their own ﬁrm
(Row 5). However, this percentage is signiﬁcantly higher for the subset of patents that are
from company towns (14.4%), foreshadowing the creative myopia of inventors from these
locations.
Furthermore, in terms our TechnologyMyopia variable, approximately 64% of the prior
a r tc i t e db yt h ea v e r a g ep a t e n ti si nt h es a m et e c h n o l o g yﬁeld as the citing patent (Row 6).
Also, on average, Locational Myopia is approximately 30%; that is, about one third of the
15prior art cited by the average patent is from the same MSA as the citing patent (Row 7). In
addition, on average 91.7% of citations made by a ﬁrm in a given year are to prior art the ﬁrm
has never cited before (Row 8). Finally, in terms of impact, the mean patent in our sample
receives a citation from approximately 14 subsequent inventions (Row 10).
We provide insight into the diﬀerences in citing behavior between inventors from company
towns and those from other locations in Table 3. Although inventors of the average com-
pany town patent self-cite with almost twice the propensity of the average patent from other
locations (19.5% compared to 10.6%; Column (II), Rows 5 and 6), company town inventors
make less than half the proportion of citations to prior art from the local MSA that was
not developed by their own ﬁrm (2.8% compared to 7.0%; Column (III)). The inventors of
the average company town patent also base a smaller fraction of their overall prior art on
inventions by other ﬁrms that are outside their local MSA (73% compared to 79%; Column
(V)).
4.2 Are Company Towns More Myopic?
4.2.1 Matched Patent Results
A comparison of mean values of assignee self-citation rates by company town patents versus
those from other locations suggests that a larger fraction of the prior art used in company
town inventions is drawn from the inventors’ own ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, the mean citation rate
for company town patents is 14.4%, compared to only 8.7% for other locations (Table 2, Row
5).
However, this simple comparison of means may belie important distributional diﬀerences
between company town patents and those from other locations. For example, company town
ﬁrms may be more focused on certain technology ﬁelds that lend themselves to higher levels
of appropriation (and thus higher self-citations rates). Or company town ﬁrms may have had
relatively higher levels of innovative activity earlier in our sample period when communica-
tion technologies were more costly thus resulting in higher self-citation rates, not because of
16creative myopia but rather due to higher costs of accessing external knowledge at the time
they were relatively more active.
We employ a matched sample method similar to that pioneered by Jaﬀe et al. (1993)
in order to control for the underlying distribution of innovative activity across technology
ﬁelds and time.10 We begin with the set of company town patents where all inventors on
each patent, in cases of multiple-inventor patents, are based in the same location. There are
23,007 such patents. We then select a “control patent” for each company town patent using
the following algorithm: 1) Construct the control sample from patents originating in the 60
MSAs that are not identiﬁed as company towns and that do not have any inventors residing in
any of the 12 company town MSAs; 2) Segment this set of patents to ensure matched patents
are produced by laboratories of similar size in terms of the number of patents received during
the sample period;11 3) Of these, identify patents having the same application year as the focal
patent; 4) Of these, identify the patent(s) having the most USPC classiﬁcations in common
with the focal patent. At minimum, eligible control patents will have in common the three-
digit technology ﬁeld. Otherwise, control patents have the same primary classiﬁcation or the
same primary and secondary classiﬁcation and so on, and we choose the patent that exhibits
the greatest degree of similarity with the focal patent. If we are unable to ﬁnd a control
patent with at least the same 3-digit technology ﬁeld as the focal patent, then we drop the
focal patent from the sample; and, 5) If more than one control patent remains as the “best”
possible control, then we select the patent closest to the focal patent in terms of issue date
as the control (in the event of a tie, we select randomly).12
10We fully appreciate the critiques of this method presented in Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005) and Thomp-
son (2006). We address this by matching on both more detailed and multiple technology categories; still, we
recognize that the matching process is imperfect. We further address this issue in our conditional logit
analysis.
11Here patents from large company town laboratories (ﬁrms in an MSA that receive 400 or more patents
during the sample period) are matched with patents from large labs in more diversiﬁed locations. Similarly,
patents from small company town laboratories (ﬁrms in an MSA that receive less than 400 patents during
the sample period) are matched with patents from small labs in more diversiﬁed locations.
12Given the construction of our matched sample, the potential exists that a given control patent is matched
multiple times to diﬀerent focal patents. In addition, at a broad conceptual level, we note that this method-
ology implicitly assumes that the spatial distribution of patents, technology, and ﬁrms are all exogenous and
independent.
17We report the average values of our set of myopia measures at the patent level for inventions
from company towns versus those from other locations in Table 4. We divide our sample into
two, such that patents by large laboratories (with 400 or more patents assigned over the
11-year sample period) are in one subsample and patents assigned to smaller labs are in the
other.13 We base the results presented in the top panel (A) on the large-lab subsample.
The results in the ﬁrst row indicate that the assignee self-citation rate for company town
inventions is 1.27 times higher than for similar patents from more diverse locations; on average
28% of all citations made by company town inventors are to prior inventions from their own
ﬁrm compared to only 22% in other locations. We interpret this result as suggestive that
company town inventors are more myopic in the innovation process than those from other
locations.
We also ﬁnd evidence that company town inventors draw slightly (2%) less widely from
other technology ﬁelds (Row 2); on average, 66% of citations of company town patents refer
to patents in the same technology class as the citing patent while in other locations this is
only 63%. This result remains remarkably consistent even when we drop self-citations from
t h ea n a l y s i s( R o w9 ) .I ti si m p o r t a n tt or e c a l lt h a tw ec o n d u c to u ra n a l y s i sa tt h et w o - d i g i t
NBER classiﬁcation level of technological similarity. This is a broad-level taxonomy with
category distinctions such as “organic compounds,” “drugs,” and “biotechnology.” So, to the
extent that company town inventions draw upon a technologically narrower set of prior ideas
within this level of classiﬁcation relative to other locations we miss detecting diﬀerences at
that degree of technological speciﬁcity.
T h er e s u l t sr e p o r t e di nR o w3i n d i c a t et h a tc ompany town inventions from large labs
draw 25% more of their prior art from their local area. However, this is primarily the result
of their tendency to build upon their own lab’s prior art (i.e., same ﬁrm, same MSA). When
we drop assignee self-citations from the sample (Row 10), we see that these inventors draw
13We use the term “laboratory” to denote the research presence of a ﬁrm in a single location. In other
words, we would refer to a ﬁrm that patents in three locations as having three labs. Where it is obvious that
we are referring to a ﬁrm in a single location context we use the term “ﬁrm” and “lab” interchangeably.
18less heavily from other local inventors than inventors in industrially dispersed locations. In
other words, company town inventors are not geographically myopic beyond their tendency
to build disproportionately on prior art from their own lab. This is underscored when we
focus only on lab-level self-citations (Row 4). The large lab self-citation rate of company
town inventions is over 40% greater than that of inventions from outside company towns.
The results reported in Row 5 indicate that 79% of the citations made by company town
inventors are to prior art that their lab has not cited before. This is less than the 83% of
prior art cited by ﬁrms in more industrially dispersed locations that is new to the citing ﬁrm;
moreover, this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, this result persists when we
drop self-citations from the sample (Row 6). In addition, the 4% diﬀerence in the fraction of
prior art utilized that is new to the inventing ﬁrm is more important than it may ﬁrst appear
since this measure is the yearly average. This diﬀerence is compounded year after year as
ﬁrms in more diverse locations refresh the pool of knowledge upon which they build more
quickly.
The results reported in Row 7 suggest that large-lab company town inventors build upon
slightly newer prior art as measured by citation lag in years.14 However, this diﬀerence is
driven by self-citations as this diﬀerence disappears when these citations are excluded (Row
11). We ﬁnd similar results when we examine the citation lag to the most recent citation on
a patent, rather than the average lag across all citations (Rows 8 and 12).
In the lower panel (B) of Table 4 we examine the same set of myopia measures, this time
applied to the subsample of small labs. Overall, these results indicate that small labs in
14Our temporal myopia measures include the average and minimum citation lags measured in years. Specif-
ically, we deﬁne a lag as the diﬀerence between the grant year of the citing patent i,( gyeari), and the grant
year of a cited patent x,( gyearx). Thus, the average citation lag is the average diﬀerence in grant years
between the citing patent and each cited patent. That is, if the citing patent makes C citations, then the







This is the variable shown on Rows 7, 11, 19 and 23. In contrast, the minimum citation lag is:
LagtoMostRecentPatenti = min{gyeari − gyearx}|C
x=1
This is the variable shown on Rows 8, 12, 20 and 24.
19company towns exhibit signiﬁcantly less myopic behavior than their large-lab counterparts.
The diﬀerences across our myopia measures between company towns and other locations are
much smaller in magnitude and in some cases go in the opposite direction. For example, small-
lab inventors are slightly less likely to self-cite than their non-company town counterparts.
To summarize, company town inventors at large labs are myopic in the sense that they
are more likely to build upon prior art from their own lab and they are also more likely to
build upon prior art their lab has built upon in the past, whether it is their own or invented
by others. However, company town inventors at small labs do not exhibit this type of myopic
behavior. Also, we ﬁnd no evidence that company town inventors from large or small labs
draw excessively upon older, potentially outdated ideas.
4.2.2 Conditional Logit Results
To conﬁrm the results of the matched pair analysis and to control for other determinants of
self-citation, we estimate a conditional logit model for the probability of each citing-cited pair
of patents in the sample falling into one of the following mutually exclusive categories: (a)
a self-citation within the same “laboratory,” (b) a citation made by the focal laboratory to
another entity within the same MSA, or (c) a citation to prior inventions developed outside the
inventors’ own MSA. In the spirit of the classic citation function (Caballero and Jaﬀe (2002)),
we control for diﬀerences in the number of potentially citable patents in each category by
estimating the McFadden choice model (McFadden (1974)) with the size of the relevant pool of
possible citations as an attribute of each of these alternatives.15 In these regressions, the main
variables of interest are the company town dummy and the large laboratory dummy.16 We
also control for MSA size (total number of patents and population), the number of university
patents in the MSA, the technology class of the citing patent, and the citation lag (diﬀerence
between the grant years of the citing and cited patents).
15Citation functions of the type proposed by Caballero and Jaﬀe (2002) that are estimated from cell counts
prove very diﬃcult to estimate for these data since cells are so sparsely populated.
16We use the term “large” laboratories to denote those labs that are assigned 400 or more patents over the
period under study: 1985-1995.
20The results from our conditional logit regression, presented in Tables 5 and 6, suggest a
signiﬁcant degree of myopia in company towns. These tables report the marginal eﬀects at
sample means of each explanatory variable on the probability of citations made by a patent
falling into each category. All of the estimated marginal eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 1% level
or better, even with robust standard errors.
In Table 5, the positive and strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect of the company town dummy on the
self-citation and citation-within-MSA outcomes indicates a signiﬁcant degree of myopia. The
magnitude of this eﬀect is substantial. In terms of odds ratios, all else equal, compared to a
patent from a less concentrated MSA, a patent generated in a company town is more than
three times more likely to self-cite its own lab, relative to the probability of citing a patent
originating outside its own location. Citation to the same lab or same MSA is slightly more
likely (odds-ratio of 1.04) in larger MSAs (i.e., locations with more overall patents) and less
likely in MSAs with more university patents.
T h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on the citation lag indicates that citations made to older patents
are less likely to be a self-citation or a within-MSA citation. There are also signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences across technology classes and a very large negative eﬀe c to ft h ed i v e r s i t yo ft e c h n o l o g y
on the probability of self- or within-MSA citation. We obtain very similar results when we add
additional controls for the year the citation is made or the year the cited patent is granted.
Table 6 allows for a diﬀerent eﬀect of being in a company town for small versus large
ﬁrms. We interact a large-lab dummy (the lab has over 400 patents assigned during the
period 1985-1995) with a dummy for company town. The large and positive main eﬀect and
interaction eﬀect indicate that myopia is much more signiﬁcant for larger compared to smaller
ﬁrms. Estimated coeﬃcients on the other variables are very similar to those in Table 5.
After controlling for a variety of other MSA characteristics, we thus ﬁnd evidence of
signiﬁcantly higher rates of within-ﬁr ma n dw i t h i n - M S Ac i t a t i o ni nc o m p a n yt o w n s .A sw e
ﬁnd in the matched-pairs analysis, large labs drive this phenomenon. Even after controlling
for diﬀerences in the size of the pool of self-citable patents, smaller companies are signiﬁcantly
21less likely to cite their own patents or patents originating in the same MSA.
4.3 Does Myopia Hinder Innovation Impact?
The ﬁndings we report above suggest that innovation in company towns is more myopic
than in other locations. It is tempting to assume that myopia in innovation is undesirable.
However, we have no basis upon which to make such an assumption. In this section, we bring
this question to the data.
4 . 3 . 1 C r e a t i v eM y o p i aa n dt h eI m p a c to nF u t u r eI n n o v a t i o n
We employ the count of citations received by a patent as a proxy for the impact it has had
on subsequent innovation. Several studies have shown the number of citations received to be
correlated with various measures of patent value, including patent renewals (Harhoﬀ et al.
(1999)), consumer surplus (Trajtenberg (1990)), expert opinion (Albert et al. (1991)), and
market value of the assignee ﬁrm (Hall et al. (2005)).17
We compare the relative impact of inventions across location types using the matched
sample method. To this end we employ the same sample of matched patents as that described
above to determine whether patents originating in company towns receive fewer citations than
similar patents originating in more industrially diverse locations.
In Table 7 we report the average number of citations received by inventions from company
towns versus those from other locations. Using the same matched sample as described above,
we present results based on patents by large labs in the top panel and by small labs in the
lower panel.
We report the main result in the ﬁrst row of the table. Patents by inventors at large
ﬁrms in company towns have less impact on subsequent innovation than other patents in the
17In addition, the interpretation of citations received as a proxy for impact is consistent with that held by
the USPTO: “If a single document is cited in numerous patents, the technology revealed in that document
is apparently involved in many developmental eﬀorts. Thus, the number of times a patent document is cited
may be a measure of its technological signiﬁcance.” (Oﬃce of Technology Assessment and Forecast, Sixth
Report, 1976, p. 167).
22same technology ﬁeld, although the diﬀerence is modest (8%) . However, this is not true for
t h ei m p a c to fs m a l lﬁrms. In this case, patents from company towns receive just as many
citations as those from more diverse locations (Row 10).
Consistent with our prior results based on citations made, patents by inventors at large
company town ﬁrms receive 1.8 times the number of self-citations received by similar patents
from more diverse locations. In other words, given the slightly smaller overall impact of
patents from large ﬁrms in company towns, a much larger fraction of the impact is realized
by the (large) inventing ﬁrm itself in company towns compared to elsewhere (Row 2). This
is not the case with small ﬁrms (Row 11).
We ﬁnd no evidence that the impact of company town patents is more technologically
concentrated than patents in more diverse locations. Between 40 and 50% of all citations
received come from outside the focal patent’s own technology ﬁeld. This applies to both large
and small ﬁrms (Rows 3 and 12).
Consistent with other ﬁndings in prior studies concerning the localization of knowledge
ﬂows, such as Jaﬀe et al. (1993), Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005), Agrawal et al. (2006),
and Rosenthal and Strange (2008), we ﬁnd that ﬁrms receive a signiﬁcant fraction of their
citations from patents produced in their own MSA (Row 4). However, the greater tendency
of large company town ﬁrms to receive citations from their own MSA is attributed to the
fact that they internalize more of the beneﬁts of their own research relative to ﬁrms in other
locations. The results reported in Row 8, where we drop assignee self-citations, conﬁrm
this intuition; comparing the number of citations received from local inventors, patents in
industrially dispersed locations receive more than twice the number of citations as those
received by company town inventions.
In terms of the geographic scope of their impact, patents produced in company towns seem
to have less impact regardless of the size of the producing lab. Large lab inventions developed
in company towns are cited in only 4.55 unique MSAs on average compared to inventions
developed in other locations that are cited in 5.11 unique MSAs (Row 6). In other words,
23inventions from company towns impact subsequent innovation in 10% fewer locations, on
average. Upon excluding self-citations the diﬀerence becomes even more dramatic. Company
town inventions impact subsequent innovation in approximately 17% fewer locations (Row 9).
The company town eﬀect on smaller labs is present, but less pronounced. The company town
discount is approximately 3% and increases to 4% when self-citations are excluded (Rows 15
and 18).
5C o n c l u s i o n
Company towns are an interesting feature of the geography of innovation: Inventive activity
in some locations is dominated by a single organization, which may have important implica-
tions for the economics of localized knowledge spillovers. We ﬁnd that in these locations, large
ﬁrms tend to be more myopic than those in locations where the inventive activity is less con-
centrated. However, smaller ﬁrms located in company towns do not exhibit myopic behavior,
suggesting that geography need not dictate access to knowledge produced elsewhere. Instead,
geographic isolation may facilitate the development of certain attitudes towards innovation
to which inventors in large-ﬁrm environments might be particularly susceptible.
T h ec a u s e so ft h i sm y o p i aa r eu n c l e a r .O n eh y p o t h e s i si st h a ti tr e ﬂects the Not Invented
Here Syndrome, the alleged tendency of R&D workers to discount or ignore knowledge from
sources external to their organization or work team. In large ﬁrms located in company towns,
this propensity may be particularly strong.
The NIH Syndrome is generally thought to have a negative impact on the productivity of
R&D; if this is true, then the myopia we observe should have a negative eﬀect on the impact
of these inventions. Interestingly, however, we see only modest evidence of this, at least as
captured by the number of citations received by the patents belonging to the large ﬁrms in our
sample. Myopic inventors in large ﬁrms tend to produce patents that are less likely to be cited
externally, but this is largely made up for by higher levels of internal citations. Furthermore,
it may be that the economic value of patents that are disproportionately self-cited is lower. In
24this case, myopia would have an even greater negative impact. But this ﬁnding also points to
potential beneﬁts associated with “in group favoritism” as a mechanism supporting eﬃcient
internal exchange and coordination.
The forward citation patterns we observe, both higher rates of self-citation and a narrower
scope of geographic impact, are also consistent with ﬁr m si nc o m p a n yt o w n sh a v i n gah i g h e r
ability to appropriate returns from R&D. Choosing to be geographically isolated may be an
eﬀective way to limit spillovers to competitors. In other words, geographic isolation may
lower the cost of appropriating knowledge developed in-house while at the same time increase
the cost of accessing externally generated knowledge. The fact that some ﬁrms choose to
locate in company towns while others do not reveals diﬀerences in the relative costs and
beneﬁts associated with knowledge appropriation and access across ﬁrms. As noted above, our
empirical analysis implicitly assumes that the spatial distribution of ﬁrms and technology is
exogenous and independent. If instead we allow for endogenous optimizing choices of location
the interpretation of these results may be rather diﬀerent. Identifying ﬁrm characteristics that
underlie diﬀerences in the relative costs and beneﬁts associated with knowledge appropriation
and access is the next logical step in this line of inquiry.
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31Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All MSAs Company Towns Other Locations
Mean Median Mean Mean
1. Patent count by MSA 3,668 1,392 1,917 4,018
(5,470) (2,421) (5,845)
2. No. Citations Made by Patent 9.665 9.638 8.568 9.885
(1.583) (1.499) (1.517)
Concentration1
3. Firm 0.871 0.935 0.550 0.935
(0.163) (0.149) (0.053)
4. Technology 0.916 0.931 0.841 0.931
(0.050) (0.086) (0.014)
Myopia2
5. Assignee (Self-Citation) 0.097 0.091 0.144 0.087
(0.047) (0.073) (0.034)
6. Technology 0.641 0.639 0.652 0.638
(0.034) (0.057) (0.028)
7. Location 0.301 0.290 0.377 0.286
(0.117) (0.182) (0.094)
Percentage of New Citations3
8. All Citations 0.917 0.912 0.915 0.917
(0.020) (0.032) (0.017)
9. Excluding Self-Citations 0.919 0.914 0.923 0.918
(0.019) (0.029) (0.016)
10. No. Cites Rcvd by Patent 14.422 13.586 14.843 14.337
(4.591) (8.098) (3.619)
11. No. of Patents4 264,078 23,007 241,071
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 1Concentration measures the dispersion of patents within an MSA across
ﬁrms (or 2-digit technology classiﬁc a t i o n s )u s i n gaH e r ﬁndahl type measure where lower values reﬂect higher levels
of concentration; here, “Firm" is equivalent to Assignee. 2Myopia measures the rate at which a citing and cited
patent have the same speciﬁed characteristic (i.e., same assignee, 2-digit technology classiﬁcation, or MSA).
3Percentage of New Citations is the MSA average annual percentage of cited patents that are cited for the ﬁrst
time; here, “Self-Citations" are citations between citing and cited patents with the same assignee. 4This is the
total number of patents aggregated over all MSAs in the sample; company towns versus all other MSAs are broken







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 4: Creative Myopia: Company Towns versus Other Locations
No. of Patent Mean by: Diﬀerence t-statistic
Matched Pairs Company Other in Means
Towns Locations
(I) (II) (III) (II) - (III)
A. Large Lab1
Self-Citation Rate2
1. Assignee 14,992 0.28 0.22 0.06*** 17.82
2. Technology 14,992 0.66 0.63 0.02*** 6.14
3. MSA 14,992 0.25 0.20 0.06*** 18.26
4. Lab 14,992 0.23 0.16 0.07*** 22.56
Percentage of New Citations3
5. All Citations 15,851 0.79 0.83 -0.04*** -25.55
6. Excluding Self-Citations 15,851 0.83 0.86 -0.03*** -18.26
Citation Lag (Years)4
7. Average All Patent Citations 14,992 6.15 6.40 -0.25** -2.05
8. To Most Recent Cited Patent 14,992 2.83 3.00 -0.18*** -4.09
Excluding Assignee Self-Citations
Self-Citation Rate2
9. Technology 13,173 0.65 0.63 0.01*** 3.39
10. MSA 13,173 0.03 0.04 -0.01*** -6.12
Citation Lag (Years)4
11. Average All Patent Citations 13,173 6.49 6.55 -0.06 -1.10
12. To Most Recent Cited Patent 13,173 3.51 3.55 -0.05 -1.32
B. Small Lab5
Self-Citation Rate2
13. Assignee 5,099 0.12 0.12 0.001 0.11
14. Technology 5,099 0.69 0.67 0.01** 2.12
15. MSA 5,099 0.13 0.14 -0.01** -2.15
16. Lab 5,099 0.09 0.07 0.01*** 3.14
Percentage of New Citations3
17. All Citations 4,318 0.91 0.89 0.02*** 5.16
18. Excluding Self-Citations 4,318 0.92 0.89 0.02*** 5.74
Citation Lag (Years)4
19. Average All Patent Citations 5,099 6.37 6.37 0.001 0.02
20. To Most Recent Cited Patent 5,099 3.22 3.10 0.12** 2.33
Excluding Assignee Self-Citations
Self-Citation Rate2
21. Technology 4,810 0.68 0.67 0.01** 2.06
22. MSA 4,810 0.05 0.08 -0.03*** -7.78
Citation Lag (Years)4
23. Average All Patent Citations 4,810 6.54 6.57 -0.03 -0.42
24. To Most Recent Cited Patent 4,810 3.57 3.42 0.15*** 2.65
*** = signiﬁcant at 1%, ** = signiﬁcant at 5%. 1A Large Lab is an assignee in a particular MSA that obtains 400
or more patents during the sample period. 2Self-Citation Rate measures, at the patent level, the rate at which a
citing and cited patent have the same assignee (or 2-digit technology classiﬁc a t i o n ,o rM S A ,o rL a b ) .3Percentage
of New Citations is the MSA average annual percentage of cited patents that are cited for the ﬁrst time. 4Citation
Lag measures, at the level of the citing patent, the time lag between citing and cited patent issue years. 5AS m a l l
Lab is an assignee in a particular MSA that obtains less than 400 patents during the sample period.
34Table 5: Conditional Logit Regression: Marginal Eﬀects
Lab Level Citation Citation
Self-Citation1 within MSA Outside MSA3
(non-self-cite)2
Citing-cited pair speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
Citing Patent MSA:
Company Town Dummy 0.028* 0.042* -0.070*
33.41 30.17 -45.59
No. of Patents in MSA 0.0004* 0.005* -0.006*
21.26 70.83 -74.67
Number of University Patents -0.002* -0.033* 0.035*
in MSA (1000s) -4.55 -28.50 28.87
MSA Population (millions) -0.0002* -0.005* 0.005*
-6.48 -37.61 38.41
MSA Technology Dispersion -0.033* -0.044* 0.077*
-9.89 -4.10 6.91
Citing-cited Patent Citation Lag -0.001* -0.009* 0.010*
-52.05 -116.06 128.12
Citing Patent Technology Class Eﬀects x x x
Choice SpeciﬁcV a r i a b l e s
Number of Citable Patents in MSA 1.4E-10* -9.00E-09* 8.90E-09*
8.92 -8.92 8.92
Number of Citable Patents Outside MSA 8.3E-10* 8.90E-09* -9.70E-09*
8.92 8.92 -8.92
Number of Potential Self-cites -9.70E-10* 1.40E-10* 8.30E-10*
-8.92 8.92 8.92
Robust standard errors. * = signiﬁcant at 1%. N = 4,923,693. The dependent variable identiﬁes a citation:
1within the same “laboratory” (where citing and cited patents are produced in the same MSA and issued to the
same assignee); 2made by the focal laboratory to another entity within the same MSA (where citing and cited
patents are produced in the same MSA but are issued to diﬀerent assignees); and, 3to prior inventions developed
outside the inventors’ own MSA (where citing and cited patents are produced in diﬀerent MSAs).
35Table 6: Conditional Logit Regression: Marginal Eﬀects, Disaggregated by Lab Size
Lab Level Citation Citation
Self-Citation1 within MSA Outside MSA3
(non-self-cite)2
Citing-cited pair speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
Citing Patent MSA:
Company Town Dummy -0.003* -0.013* 0.015*
-4.25 -5.74 6.77
Large Lab Size Dummy 0.003* 0.050* -0.053*
12.79 66.50 -68.04
Company Town Dummy 0.038* 0.034* -0.072*
X Large Lab Size Dummy 14.87 11.95 -20.82
No. of Patents in MSA 0.0003* 0.005* -0.005*
17.13 62.95 -65.89
Number of University Patents -0.001* -0.025* 0.025*
in MSA (1000s) -1.69 -21.71 21.41
MSA Population (millions) -0.0001* -0.004* 0.004*
-3.33 -31.79 31.91
MSA Technology Dispersion -0.049* -0.093* 0.141*
-15.02 -8.49 12.34
Citing-cited Patent Citation Lag -0.001* -0.009* 0.010*
-51.40 -114.29 126.13
Citing Patent Technology Class Eﬀects x x x
Choice speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
Number of Citable Patents in MSA 1.70E-10* -1.10E-08* 1.10E-08*
10.62 -10.62 10.62
Number of Citable Patents Outside MSA 9.80E-10* 1.10E-08* -1.20E-08*
10.62 10.62 -10.62
Number of Potential Self-cites -1.10E-09* 1.70E-10* 9.80E-10*
-10.62 10.62 10.62
Robust standard errors. * = signiﬁcant at 1%. N = 4,923,693. The dependent variable identiﬁes a citation:
1within the same “laboratory” (where citing and cited patents are produced in the same MSA and issued to the
same assignee); 2made by the focal laboratory to another entity within the same MSA (where citing and cited
patents are produced in the same MSA but are issued to diﬀerent assignees); and, 3to prior inventions developed
outside the inventors’ own MSA (where citing and cited patents are produced in diﬀerent MSAs).
36Table 7: Impact Measured by Citations Received1
No. of Patent Mean by: Diﬀerence t-statistic
Matched Pairs Company Other in Means
Towns Locations
(I) (II) (III) (II) - (III)
A. Large Lab Patents Matched
Includes Assignee Self-Citations
1. All Citations 16,266 13.24 14.30 -1.07*** -5.08
2. Citations Received from same Assignee 16,266 3.73 2.04 1.69*** 21.51
3. Citations Received from same Technology 16,266 7.70 7.51 0.19 1.46
4. Citations Received from Focal MSA 16,266 3.86 2.87 0.99*** 11.61
5. Citations Received from Same Lab 16,266 3.29 1.63 1.66*** 23.14
6. Number of Unique Citing MSAs2 16,266 4.55 5.11 -0.55*** -12.91
Excludes Assignee Self-Citations
7. Citations Received from same Technology 16,266 5.40 6.39 -0.99*** -9.43
8. Citations Received from Focal MSA 16,266 0.56 1.24 -0.68*** -19.36
9. Number of Unique Citing MSAs2 16,266 3.81 4.59 -0.77*** -18.98
B. Small Lab Patents Matched
Includes Assignee Self-Citations
10. All Citations 5,757 12.96 13.11 -0.15 -0.44
11. Self-Citations Received from same Assignee 5,757 0.95 1.17 -0.22*** -2.85
12. Citations Received from same Technology 5,757 8.03 7.89 0.14 0.60
13. Citations Received from Focal MSA 5,757 2.01 2.16 -0.15 -1.08
14. Citations Received from Same Lab 5,757 0.68 0.86 -0.18*** -2.81
15. Number of Unique Citing MSAs2 5,757 5.33 5.52 -0.19** -2.46
Excludes Assignee Self-Citations
16. Citations Received from same Technology 5,757 7.37 7.12 0.25 1.13
17. Citations Received from Focal MSA 5,757 1.33 1.30 0.03 0.29
18. Number of Unique Citing MSAs2 5,757 5.02 5.22 -0.20*** -2.66
*** = signiﬁcant at 1%, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 %. 1Citations Received measures, at the patent level, the number of citations a focal
patent receives from patents exhibiting the speciﬁed characteristic (e.g. same assignee, 2-digit technology classiﬁcation, etc.).
2Measures the number of distinct MSAs that produce patents that cite the focal patent.
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